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In adopting worker's compensation, the greatest political turmoil devel-
oped over the issue of private versus state insurance of workers' compen-
sation risk. Although workers' compensation is often described as "social
insurance," it is actually an employer mandate that a specific set of benefits
be paid to the victims of workplace accidents. Employers could purchase
insurance to provide these benefits, and an enormous struggle arose over
the issue whether employers should purchase the insurance from private
insurance companies or through a state-run fund. Union leaders pushed
strongly for state insurance on the grounds that private insurers were
profiting from denying benefits to many deserving injured workers. Insur-
ers fought to save their business and charged that state insurance was a
sign of creeping socialism. The choice between state and private insurance
made by various state legislatures established the existing system today
and set the stage for later debates over the government's underwriting of
unemployment, health, and disability risks.' Most states allowed employ-
ers to contract with private insurers to underwrite this workplace accident
risk. Seven states, however, established monopoly state insurance funds
and ten more states created state funds that competed with private insur-
ers.2 In this chapter we examine the decision to establish state funds to
underwrite workers' compensation risks at the time the legislation was
first adopted.
Quantitative analysis of the legislative decisions to adopt state insur-
ance shows that monopoly state insurance was an unlikely outcome of
the general workers' compensation debate. In most states opposition from
insurance companies and farmers overcame the labor unions' demands
for state insurance, causing legislatures to choose private insurance. In
some states the competing interest groups compromised by allowing pri-
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vate insurers to compete with a state fund. Monopoly state insurance was
implemented if either of two conditions occurred: (1) strong labor unions
were able to enact state insurance in the face of relatively weak insurance
interests and agricultural interests, or (2) monopoly state insurance was
swept into place when a strong political reform movementfor example,
progressives in the early 1910s and nonpartisans in the late 1910sincor-
porated unions' demands for state insurance into a broader program of
socioeconomic changes.
The richness of the state insurance debate is captured more fully by ex-
amining the decision process in three states: Washington, Ohio, and Min-
nesota. In all three states narrow interest groups set the terms of the debate
and influenced decisions. Meanwhile, progressive political coalitions
played a major role in determining the fate of monopoly state insurance
during the period from 1910 to 1920. Washington chose monopoly state
insurance when workers' compensation was originally adopted in 1911, as
progressive reformers within the Republican party played the predomi-
nant role in establishing monopoly state insurance. Following the imple-
mentation of a monopoly state fund in 1911, Ohio union leaders and in-
surance companies fought over the issue throughout the decade. After a
series of court battles, referenda, administrative decisions, and subsequent
legislation, the ultimate decision on the state fund's monopoly depended
on the success of the Democratic party, which was the progressive reform
party in Ohio. When Minnesota first enacted workers' compensation in
1913, organized labor's efforts to obtain state insurance failed because it
held too little political power to overcome conservative Republicans' rejec-
tion of the idea. The Non-Partisan League, a populist coalition of farmers
and organized labor, developed enough strength to reopen the issue in
1919, but without a majority in the legislature, their efforts to adopt state
insurance failed by one vote in the Senate. In general, the importance of
progressive reformers in establishing state insurance in several states
should not be underestimated.
The chapter helps illuminate a central issue in the empirical political
economy literature. Political scientists and economists have long debated
whether broad-based political coalitions, such as political parties, or nar-
rowly defined economic interest groups are the determining factor in the
development of legislation. The recent analyses of the enactment of the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887 exemplify the polar posi-
tions that scholars have taken in their explanations of the origins of reg-
ulation. Thomas Gilligan, William Marshall, and Barry Weingast (1989)
argue that the ICC was enacted as the result of a compromise between
economic interest groupsthe short-haul shippers and the railroads
that had a direct economic stake in the issue. Keith Poole and Howard
Rosenthal (1993, 1994) claim, by contrast, that the ICC was passed by
a broad political economic coalition, and that the argument for narrow150Chapter 6
economic interests as the catalyst for ICC enactment is overemphasized.
The story of how state workers' compensation insurance funds came to
be adopted in the 191 Os emphasizes that both narrow economic interests
and broader political interests determine legislative outcomes, but the im-
portance of each factor varied from state to state. Indeed, as our research
suggests, when we must take into account the importance of a political re-
form movement, our preconceived notions of how different interest groups
stood on the issue of state insurance is upset. Thus, instead of disagree-
ment among scholars, our analysis suggests that cooperation among the
two intellectual camps will provide a much richer understanding of the
growth of government over the last century.
6.1The Debate over State Insurance
One feature of the workers' compensation system that caused bitter dis-
pute across many states was the method by which the insurance system
would be administered. In many states there was a strong movement for
state insurance, in which all risks associated with the new law would be
insured through newly created state funds and bureaucracies. Social re-
formers and labor leaders vilified the casualty insurance industry because
insurers were seen as contributing to the negligence liability system's deba-
cle. Crystal Eastman (1910), one of the leading proponents of the switch
to workers' compensation in the United States, found two major faults
with the insurance industry: the presence of liability insurance lowered the
chances of an injured worker's receiving compensation, and the insurance
industry was profiting at the expense of workers' suffering. According to
Eastman (1910, 194), when an employer insured his risk through a third
party, the injured worker was sure to be the loser because "the insurance
company contracts only to assume the employer's legal liability, not to
underwrite his moral responsibilities, or carry out the promptings of his
sympathy." Further, since the insurance company was "equipped with sys-
tem, money, skill, and experience," the chances of successfully suing an
insured employer for damages were "formidable." We have already quoted
in chapter 2 the similar conclusions reached by historian Robert Asher
(1969, 464).
Reformers and historians were in fact mistaken, however, in assuming
that workers always fared poorly at the hands of liability insurers. Our
analysis of Michigan Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics data from
1897 to 1903 found that those workers who were employed by firms that
carried liability insurance were just as likely to receive accident compensa-
tion as those workers whose firms had no insurance (Kantor and Fishback
1995, 429). Indeed, some companies clearly influenced how their liability
insurance carriers settled claims by injured workers or their families. Con-
sider the case of Joseph Garsaw, who was killed while working for the
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Cloquet, Minnesota. Northern Lumber's liability insurance company
found that "[t]he case was a pure accident. There was no defect whatever
in the apparatus and it would hardly seem that under the [common] law
that any damage could have been collected." Thus, the insurance company
offered Garsaw's widow $250 to settle the case. Northern Lumber, how-
ever, "desired an adequate payment to be made for the benefit of the
widow and children," so Northern offered the deceased's family $1000 plus
funeral expenses and the insurance carrier, in turn, was to raise its contri-
bution to $500. "After talking the matter over with the widow," Northern
Lumber paid $1100 plus funeral expenses and the insurance company paid
$600. Although Northern Lumber's insurer was not willing to fully back
the company's "moral responsibilities," this case suggests that influential
clients may have been able to pressure the liability insurance companies
into providing the families of workers killed in industrial accidents with
relatively better settlements, even though the families may have received
nothing if their cases were to have gone to trial.
The insurance industry certainly understood that it had a perception
problem. The "blame for the odious conditions affecting the relations be-
tween employer and employe [sic] under the liability laws," according to
insurance industry spokesmen, lay "solely in the law. The insurance was
proper. The conduct of the insurance companies usually was proper."4
J. Scofield Rowe, vice president of the Aetna Life Insurance Company in
1912, reasoned that "[t]he Liability Insurance Companies were brought
into existence by reason of the crystallization of public opinion in support
of claim making, and are merely the resultnot the cause, of the condi-
tions complained of."5
While the insurance industry could certainly defend against claims that
the meagerness of accident compensation offered to injured workers was
entirely of the insurers' own making, the industry was more susceptible to
charges of profiteering. Social reformers and labor leaders criticized the
insurance industry because workers received less than half of the premi-
ums that employers paid to liability insurance companies. In Washington
from 1910 to 1911, for example, insurance companies typically paid out
less than 50 percent of the employers' liability premiums they collected.6
Similar statistics were cited by employers' liability commissions in Ohio,
New York, and Illinois (Ohio Employers' Liability Commission 1911,
lxxxiii; Asher 1971, 286; Castrovinci 1976, 85). Such statistics, reformers
contended, were clear evidence that insurers were profiting from injured
workers' misfortunes. By granting the state a monopoly on the writing of
such insurance, reformers continued, both workers and employers could
be made better off. By reducing the transaction costs and profits associ-
ated with private insurance, employers allegedly would have been able to
offer more attractive accident benefits, while paying less for the insurance
to provide such generous benefits.
Even after the adoption of workers' compensation laws, private insur-152Chapter 6
ance companies were chided for undermining the spirit of cooperation
between employers and employees that the new laws were designed to fos-
ter. George M. Gillette, the president of the Minnesota Employers' Asso-
ciation and a central figure in the state's adoption of workers' compensa-
tion, issued an ultimatum to the insurance companies just after the law
was adopted in Minnesota in 1913: "My belief is that it would be good
policy on the part of the liability companies not to try to make too much
money during the earlier stages of the operation of this law, for I believe
such a course would kill the goose." If complaints against insurers accrued
or rates became exorbitant and unreasonable, then Gillette warned that
"not only in my opinion will Minnesota have state insurance, but it ought
to have it."
Contrary to the rhetoric of social reformers and labor leaders, the stan-
dard by which they judged the profitability of employers' liability and
workers' compensation insurance suggests that their claims were over-
drawn. Although it is certainly difficult to assess the profitability of differ-
ent lines of insurance, we can tentatively use the ratio of losses to premi-
ums as a proxy, which is what advocates of state insurance used to justify
their position. Using Minnesota as a representative case, the insurance
companies writing workers' compensation in the state paid out between
49 and 56 percent of their premiums a few years after the passage of the
law.8 Fifteen years after the enactment of the law, and seven years after the
state insurance issue had been politically resolved in Minnesota, insurance
companies were paying out to injured workers approximately 60 percent
of their annual workers' compensation premiums.9 These workers' com-
pensation loss ratios were certainly unimpressive when compared to other
lines of insurance. From 1900 to 1927, for example, commercial fire insur-
ers paid out 57.3 percent of their annual premiums.1° And in the latter
part of the 1910s, carriers of industrial life insurance (which had no saving
component like ordinary life insurance) only paid out between 24 and 35
percent of their annual premiums.1'
Opponents of state insurance questioned the reformers' claim that in-
surance companies were earning excess profits by pointing out that the
loss ratio was a flawed measure of profitability. Testifying before the Min-
nesota legislature's Joint Workmen's Compensation Commission in 1920,
Minnesota Insurance Commissioner John B. Sanborn and H. R. Phillips,
actuary of the State Insurance Department, explained that state law re-
quired insurance companies to retain 50 percent of their premiums as an
unearned premium reserve. When policyholders paid in advance for insur-
ance protection at some future date, the insurance company was required
to put 50 percent of the premium into reserve. 12 Further, insurance compa-
nies were required to keep a loss reserve, which was a poo1 of funds able
to compensate pending claims against the insurer. David McCahan (1929,
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serve in order to ensure their ability to pay for unforeseen disasters. Also
included in the premiums that insurers collected, of course, were adminis-
trative expenses and profits.
The complicated accounting of the insurance industry could even con-
fuse practitioners in the field. For example, George D. Smith, chairman of
the Nevada Industrial Commission, which administered the state's mo-
nopolistic insurance fund, gushed that "our administrative expense is but
8% of premium income, as compared to 40% on an average for private
insurance companies."3 But such comparisons were deceptive in light of
the fact that after the first sixty days of a new policy, Nevada employers
were billed the month's premium at the end of the month. In other words,
the Nevada state fund did not have to set aside an unearned premium
reserve because premiums were determined ex post (McCahan 1929, 67).
Thus, contrary to reformers' rhetoric, simply observing what percentage
of premiums were paid out in claims provided very little information about
how efficient, profitable, or exploitative private insurance companies were.
Proponents of state insurance presented little evidence to suggest that
the state could save dramatic sums of money by reducing the overhead
associated with writing workers' compensation insurance. Critics pointed
out that it was the insurance industry, and not the state, that had vast
experience in setting rates and processing claims and, thus, could offer
insurance most cost effectively.'4 While some monopolistic state funds
claimed to have had relatively low administrative expenses, they were criti-
cized for poor service. A 1919 study of the Ohio state fund showed that
workers had to wait an average of thirty-seven days before receiving their
first payment after an accident. A Special Massachusetts Investigating
Commission, on the other hand, found that injured workers in that state,
which had no state fund, waited an average of nineteen days.15 E. H. Dow-
ney, actuary for the Pennsylvania State Insurance Department, pointed
out that "the monopolistic state fund does not have the inducement of
competition to keep itself up on its toes."16 The very fact that the state
granted itself a monopoly was prima facie evidence of its inefficiency, ac-
cording to J. V. Paterson (1913, 15), president of the Seattle Construction
and Dry Dock Company: "If the State has a superior insurance scheme it
needs no monopoly." In the final analysis, reformers' hopes for translating
efficiency gains from state insurance into more generous benefits for work-
ers were largely illusory. As E. H. Downey explained, "The form of insur-
ance has nothing to do with the scale of benefits. That is a matter of com-
promise between the employer interests and the employee interests, it
depends upon the distribution of political power in the state to be per-
fectly, brutally frank about it." 17
Opponents of state insurance pointed to the inevitable politicization of
not only the bureaucracy administering the law but also the financial as-
pects of the state fund. Rowe (1912, 12), the Aetna vice president in 1912,154Chapter 6
cautioned that it would be impossible for a "state insurance administra-
tion to be divorced from politics." W. W. Kinnard, chairman of the Massa-
chusetts Industrial Accident Board, warned the Minnesota Workmen's
Compensation Commission in 1920 that "[i]f the [monopolistic] Ohio state
fund went up Smoke City they would have to call on their legislature."8
Such fears ring true today as eight of the twenty-two state-sponsored work-
ers' compensation insurance funds are insolvent because political pressure
has forced legislators to keep rates below actuarially sound levels.'9
At the core of the state insurance debate in the early twentieth century
was simple private enterprise philosophy. State insurance supporters like
Minnesota representative Thomas J. McGrath "recognize[d] no legitimate
function that the private insurance carriers perform under a workmen's
compensation scheme that cannot be adequately and properly performed
by a state 20 The opponents of state insurance questioned why
the government should step in to provide a service that could just as easily
and cost effectively be provided by private parties. They worried that gov-
ernment intervention into insurance would lead to expansions in the state
role: "If insurance is a proper field for the State to enter, why is not manu-
facturing, or merchandising..?"' Ludwig 0. Solem, a Minnesota state
representative from Minneapolis in 1919, mocked his colleagues who be-
lieved the state could offer lower workers' compensation premiums than pri-
vate concerns: "They say that the rate will be less. My meat, grocery and
insurance bills and office rent would be less if the State paid part. They
say Insurance Companies are unnecessary. Grocerymen would be useless
too if the State took over the grocery business. If the State undertakes this
where is it going to stop? Where is there any limit?"22 Clearly the issue of
state insurance raised questions about state intervention that went well
beyond the issue of economic efficiency.
Several states chose a compromise solution by establishing a state fund
while allowing private insurers to compete with the state. The compromise
led to disadvantages and advantages for both the state fund and private
insurers. Although insurers preferred the compromise to the establishment
of a monopoly state fund, they argued that the state fund would have a
substantial advantage in the competition. In a number of states, the state
fund's administrative costs were covered by the taxpayer and not employ-
ers' premiums. Further, if the state fund became insolvent, it had the op-
tion of going to the state treasury for a bailout, allowing the state fund to
hold smaller reserves and then charge lower rates. Private insurers, on the
other hand, had the advantage of not being required to insure all employ-
ers. Members of the Ohio Manufacturing Association noted that private
insurers could "come in and pick the gilt edge risks, leaving all the hazard-
ous ones to the state ... andbring about its disorganization and insol-
vency"23
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state or private firms were the optimal agents to insure workers' compen-
sation risk. Claims that state funds could cut administrative costs were
offset by problems with the possible politicization of rates and the possi-
bility that inadequate reserves might lead to taxpayers' subsidizing the
funds. As discussed below, the choices relating to state insurance depended
more on the strength of interest groups and political reformers than on
any well-established notion of what was the optimal form of insuring work-
ers' compensation risk.
6.2The Alignment of the Interest Groups
The dispute over the state's insuring workplace accident risk was partic-
ularly bitter. Union leaders blamed insurance companies for many of the
problems of the negligence system and sought to eliminate them from
workers' compensation entirely. Insurers, who favored workers' compen-
sation because it would have enabled them to expand their coverage of
workplace accident risk, suddenly found themselves fighting to stay in this
market altogether. Employers split over the issue of state insurance. Those
that believed they would be adequately insured at lower rates in the state
fund, such as lumber and mining interests in Washington, often supported
the idea. But for every industry that anticipated favorable premiums from
the state fund, there were others that would have paid relatively higher
rates to subsidize the lower rates offered to their counterparts in other
industries. One of the salient worries that employers faced was that the
state might turn its sights onto other enterprises if the state were allowed
to supplant private insurers. Minnesota employers, for example, were re-
luctant to embrace state insurance on these grounds.24
Agricultural interests had a great deal of influence over state politics in
the early twentieth century and were very successful in their efforts to be
exempted from the workers' compensation system. Yet, even after they
had been excluded from the law's purview, farmers opposed certain fea-
tures of the legislation. Farmers may have opposed state insurance, in par-
ticular, because they anticipated that taxpayers might be called upon to
bail out insolvent state funds.25
While competing interest groups shaped the issues and put pressure on
legislators to act on their behalf, the political environment in which legisla-
tors made their choices clearly influenced whether state insurance was suc-
cessful or not. State insurance was considered radical by early-twentieth-
century standards, and opponents consistently invoked images of creeping
socialism. The union leaders and reformers who sought state insurance
typically did not have the political clout to determine the outcome of the
state insurance debate. To succeed, they often had to form a coalition with
political groups seeking far-reaching socioeconomic reforms that tran-
scended labor issues. Thus, the adoption of state insurance often de-156Chapter 6
pended on the electoral successes of the major political reform movements
of the time, including the progressives within the Democratic and Republi-
can parties between 1911 and 1913 and the populist Non-Partisan League
in the midwest in the late 1910s.
We have performed a cross-state statistical analysis of the decision be-
tween monopoly state funds, competitive state funds, and private insur-
ance during the years in which the legislatures made their long-range
choice. The results, which are discussed in detail in appendix J, support
our characterizations of the attitudes of the various interest groups. The
probability of adopting a monopoly state fund was substantially lower in
states where agriculture employed more of the labor force and insurance
companies sold more life insurance per capita. There were also signs that
large firms may have opposed state insurance, as the probability of adopt-
ing a state fund was somewhat lower in states where a larger percentage
of manufacturing workers were employed in operations with more than
five hundred workers. Thus, with the right combination of strong unions
and weaker than average agricultural and insurance interests, it was pos-
sible to obtain the passage of state insurance, even without a political
power shift in the legislature. We found statistical evidence that this con-
fluence of events may have occurred in Nevada and Wyoming.
The empirical analysis also shows that progressive reform movements
were important to the adoption of state insurance. In states where the
legislature experienced a party shift that favored reform in both houses
of the legislature, the probability of choosing a state fund jumped mark-
edly. A reform shift in only one house of the legislature was apparently
not enough to strongly raise the probability of adopting a state insurance
fund, because the legislative house that had not experienced a reform shift
could still block the introduction of the legislation. In fact, of the four
states in our sample that experienced a power shift in both branches of
the legislature, Ohio adopted a monopoly state fund, and Colorado,
Idaho, and Utah adopted competitive state funds. Meanwhile, in states
where there was more support for Theodore Roosevelt's progressive presi-
dential campaign in 1912 and where there were a broader range of progres-
sive laws, state insurance had a relatively better chance of being enacted.
The statistical analysis, taken as a whole, indicates that the adoption of
monopoly state insurance was relatively unlikely. Some states may have
adopted it because of an unusual combination of strong unions and rela-
tively weak insurance interests. If the proper combination of narrow eco-
nomic interest groups did not exist, then monopoly state insurance was
unlikely to be enacted unless union leaders melded their demands with the
broader socioeconomic agenda of a strong political reform movement.
Because the decision to implement a state insurance fund involved com-
plex coalitions across economic and political groups, an econometric anal-
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funds. In the rest of this chapter we offer detailed case studies of the strug-
gles over the state insurance issue in Washington, Ohio, and Minnesota.
Studying these three states has shown that the role of political progressives
we found in the regression analysis is actually a lower-bound estimate of
their influence over the state insurance debate.
In Washington the progressive reform movement that strongly contrib-
uted to the adoption of a state fund in that state occurred within the domi-
nant Republican party. In the absence of such a reform movement, our
regression analysis suggested that it was unlikely that Washington would
have adopted a state fund.26 The debate over state insurance in Ohio was
a drawn-out process that took the form of legislation, court fights, refer-
enda, administrative decisions, and subsequent legislation. The power
shift to the Democratic party in Ohio clearly played a role in the initial
adoption of a monopoly state fund in 1911. The econometric analysis sug-
gests that in the absence of the power shift Ohio would not have adopted
the monopoly state fund. Close analysis of the Ohio case, however, reveals
that nearly biennial shifts in the political power of the Democratic and
Republican parties led to policy swings favoring and harming the monop-
oly state fund, respectively. Finally, our examination of Minnesota reveals
that efforts to enact a state fund did not cease after a state implemented
its first workers' compensation law without a state fund. The statistical an-
alysis predicts that Minnesota would not have adopted a monopoly state
fund when it enacted workers' compensation in 1913, although it probably
would have if Minnesota had experienced a power shift in both legislative
houses. Yet the final choice in Minnesota was in doubt for another six
years. The populist Non-Partisan League gained enough strength in Min-
nesota by the late 191 Os to bring the monopoly state fund issue to a serious
legislative vote, but it never gained a majority in both legislatures and
therefore did not ultimately succeed in adopting a state fund. Supporters
of state insurance, however, fell one vote short in the Senate. These case
studies illustrate how narrow interest groups set the terms of the debate
and influenced decisions at various levels of state government, but it was
the political strength of progressive reformers that tipped the scales in
favor of relatively radical policy reform.
6.3The Adoption of State Insurance in Washington
Washington lumbermen, mine operators, and labor unions sought ways
to streamline the delivery of accident compensation to injured workers by
establishing a compulsory state insurance fund for extrahazardous jobs.
Dissatisfaction with the negligence liability system in Washington was
widespread by 1910. Employers worried about the sharp rise in their liabil-
ity insurance rates and the increasing number of court suits, as shown in
chapter 4. Workers complained of long court delays, shabby treatment by158Chapter 6
insurance companies, and the low likelihood of winning a court suit. Both
sides blamed attorneys and insurance companies for the inefficiency of
the negligence system and the large gap between what employers paid in
insurance premiums and what workers received.
In July 1910 Governor Marion Hay, like many other governors during
that year, designated a commission to investigate the employers' liability
system and to prepare a workers' compensation bill. The commission,
which was dominated by representatives from the lumber and coal indus-
tries, the two industries most dangerous for workers in the state, wrote a
bill that would have guaranteed fixed monthly benefits to workers injured
in extrahazardous employment. The most controversial features of the bill
were two state insurance funds: a fund that would have collected up to
four cents per man-day, half from workers and half from employers, to
insure medical expenses from industrial accidents (known as the "first-aid
fund"); and a fund to compensate workers' lost earnings. The funds were
to be state monopolies and contributions were compulsory, while the state
was expected to pay the costs of administering the funds. The Washington
State Federation of Labor (WSFL) was the strongest supporter of state
insurance, unalterably opposing "any bill that permitted casualty insur-
ance to continue as a disturbing factor between employer and employee
by the prevention of quick and just settlements of all questions of compen-
sation."27
Many groups expressed general support for a workers' compensation
bill but opposed specific features of the commission's bill. Insurers sup-
ported the general notion of workers' compensation, but opposed the state
fund bill because it "gives absolutely no alternative to the employer or the
employee whether they shall insure with the state or an insurance com-
pany." The Washington insurers rallied support for their position through
the Chamber of Commerce but were relatively inactive compared to the
opposition to state insurance in other states in later years. The insurers
themselves claimed that "not one liability insurance company has raised a
hand to defeat this bill. The liability companies held a meeting in New
York and agreed to permit Washington to be the 'dog' on whom the medi-
cine should be tried, and they argued that this would be a lesson to other
states who contemplated crazy legislation."28
Manufacturers who opposed the commission's bill complained that the
state fund's insurance rates were not adequately experience rated. Aware
of the dominance of coal and lumber representatives on the commission,
other manufacturers believed that the proposed state fund insurance rates
would force them to bear a disproportionate share of the coal and lumber
industries' accident costs.29 The commission bill set up funds for thirty-
one separate industries, but opponents of the bill worried that the fund in
one industry could be tapped to pay for accidents in other industries. The
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much of this objection by adding an amendment to create forty-seven sep-
arate funds such that "no class shall be liable for the depletion of the
accident fund from accidents happening in any other fund."3°
Many lumbermen, led by Speaker of the House Howard Taylor, op-
posed the first-aid fund on the grounds that they were already providing
adequate medical care at their mills. Others opposed the first-aid fund as
a source of patronage, as an opportunity to build "the greatest political
machine ever constructed under the sun. All this money is to be expended
by appointees of one man who will build $2.5 million worth of hospitals
and employ thousands of men and women to keep them going."3'
The House fought the battle over the first-aid fund, while the Senate
later fought over the state fund to replace lost earnings. The labor commit-
tee in the House, chaired by Guvnor Teats, a leading personal injury at-
torney who helped draft the commission bill, pushed for passage of the
amended state insurance bill. Antiprogressives fought to amend the bill to
eliminate the first-aid clause and the initial vote ended in a tie of forty
votes to forty votes, with sixteen absentees. Speaker Howard Taylor, who
opposed the first-aid fund, then directed that all members of the House
be found and a vote taken to reconsider the amendment. After ten more
members were located, the House voted sixty-four to twenty-six to recon-
sider the earlier vote, and then proceeded to eliminate the first-aid fund
by a vote of fifty-five to thirty-five. The House then passed workers' com-
pensation with the compulsory state insurance provision, but without the
first-aid fund, by a vote of sixty-nine to twenty-four.32
The House state insurance bill, stripped of the first-aid fund, faced stiff
competition in the Senate from a workers' compensation bill without state
insurance. Senator Ralph Metcalf, chair of the Senate Labor Committee,
proposed the alternative bill on the grounds that compulsory state insur-
ance was likely to be ruled unconstitutional because a New York court had
struck down a compulsory workers' compensation law for extrahazardous
employment in that state. The New York law, however, did not involve com-
pulsory state insurance.33
With the House threatening to kill all Senate bills if state insurance did
not pass, the showdown came in a roll-call vote on whether to replace the
House's state insurance bill with the Metcalf alternative.34 The Metcalf
proposal lost eighteen to twenty-two. Opponents of state insurance failed
again when they tried to reduce support for the final bill by saddling it
with the first-aid clause that the House had already rejected and with high
salaries for the commissioners who would administer the new workers'
compensation system. The House's bill prevailed in the Senate thirty votes
to ten.
The various interests clearly framed the debates on the first-aid fund
and the state insurance fund. The political climate in the legislature, how-
ever, may have been the decisive factor that led to the adoption of the160Chapter 6
state insurance fund. The 1911 Republican legislature was one of the most
reform-minded in Washington's history.35 Workers' compensation was just
one platform of the progressive reformers' agenda, as the legislature also
ratified the federal income tax, passed women's-hours legislation, and ex-
panded voter participation in government by establishing the initiative,
referenda, and recall processes and judicial nominations by primary. An
econometric analysis of the various roll-call votes concerning the first-aid
fund in the House and the state insurance fund in the Senate confirms that
the impact of interest group politics on the voting was overwhelmed by
the activities of progressive reformers with a broader agenda than just
workers' compensation (see Fishback and Kantor 1996, 8 19-24). The pre-
dominant influence in all the votes was the legislator's voting record on
other progressive legislation. Progressives strongly supported both the
first-aid fund in the House and the state insurance fund in the Senate.
Thus, without the strong progressive reform movement within the Repub-
lican party in the 1911 legislature, state insurance probably would not have
been enacted.
6.4The Extended Fight over Monopoly State Insurance in Ohio
The development of the state fund in Ohio differed from the experience
in Washington in that Ohio's struggle over state insurance was extended
over a number of years after enactment of workers' compensation. When
workers' compensation was first adopted in Ohio in 1911, state insurance
was packaged as part of the overall legislation. Once the state fund was
established, however, insurers and organized labor fought several conten-
tious battles over the issue. Ohio resembled Washington in one major way,
however: who won the battle over state insurance was largely determined
by changing political coalitions in state government.
As part of a political compromise to pass the Norris Act in 1910, which
sharply limited employers' defenses against negligence suits, the Ohio leg-
islature charged the Employers' Liability Commission (ELC) with the re-
sponsibility of proposing a workers' compensation bill. The ELC con-
sisted of five members: two labor representatives who followed the Ohio
State Federation of Labor's (OSFL) lead in supporting monopoly state
insurance; two employers' representatives who made no mention of the is-
sue in their published statements; and Chairman J. Harrington Boyd whose
public statements imply that he accepted the OSFL's argument for a mo-
nopoly state fund.36
Whether it was the commission's agenda-setting or the insurance com-
panies' lack of interest, only one insurance executive testified before the
ELC.37 Without additional testimony to sway their prior beliefs, the com-
mission proposed two workers' compensation bills, both requiring em-
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captured a majority of both chambers of the 1911 legislature, and progres-
sives from both parties held 47 percent of the House seats and 32 percent
of the Senate seats. Given this political environment, the ELC's relatively
radical plan for state insurance passed without serious controversy.38 Al-
though employers were required to insure through the state fund, as a com-
promise the law made employers' participation in the workers' compensa-
tion system voluntary. Those employers who opted out, however, waived
their right to invoke any of the three common law defensesassump-
tion of risk, fellow servant, and contributory negligencein a negligence
suit.
The insurance companies tested the new state insurance system at every
turn over the next several years. They initially attacked the new state fund
on the grounds that the law was unconstitutional. After the Ohio Supreme
Court validated the law in January 1912, insurers attempted to cast asper-
sion on the state fund's ability to protect employers against situations in
which injured workers filed lawsuits claiming that their accidents were
caused by an employer's willful act or disregard of a safety law.39 The insur-
ers claimed that such suits were increasingly likely because the courts were
failing to draw a clear distinction between a negligent and willful act. The
Ohio State Board of Liability Awards (the state fund administrator) re-
sponded with a pamphlet that reassured employers that the workers' com-
pensation law was constitutional and gave full protection, that the distinc-
tion between willful acts and negligence was clear, and that the attorney
general had ruled that private insurers could not sell liability insurance to
indemnify employers against willful acts.4°
The OSFL, the Board of Liability, and progressive leaders worried that
because of the confusion regarding the state fund's insurance of some
risks, many employers elected not to participate in the workers' compen-
sation system.4' At the 1912 Ohio Constitutional Convention, therefore,
they proposed a constitutional amendment that would strengthen the mo-
nopoly state fund by allowing the legislature to make workers' compen-
sation coverage compulsory. After almost no floor debate the proposal
passed the convention unanimously. Despite the public opposition of the
Ohio Board of Commerce and many manufacturers, Ohio voters approved
the workers' compensation amendment in the November 1912 election,
60 to 40 percent.42 An econometric analysis of the referendum results sug-
gests that progressive reformers strongly supported the amendment. Vot-
ers who supported Roosevelt's progressive presidential run were more
likely to support the amendment. Voters in areas with a higher percentage
of immigrants also supported the measure. The amendment received
strong opposition in agricultural areas, although the vote against workers'
compensation may have just been part of a general opposition to amend-
ing the Ohio Constitution. Agricultural areas voted against nearly all the
constitutional amendments that year.43162Chapter 6
With a larger Democratic majority and a true progressive governor in
James Cox, the 1913 legislature was fertile ground for enacting the com-
pulsory law allowed by the constitutional amendment.44 As a compromise
to employers, however, the compulsory bill was crafted to allow employers
to self-insure their workers' compensation risks. Thus, while workers' com-
pensation coverage was compulsory in Ohio, employers now had only two
options for insuring their riskthe state fund or self-insurance. A labor-
sponsored amendment in the Senate sought to prohibit employers from
maintaining mutual benefit associations with other employers in lieu of
their participation in the state fund. The amendment lost nineteen to thir-
teen, leaving open the possibility that insurance companies could sell rein-
surance to self-insuring employers, thus allowing them some access to in-
suring workers' compensation risk. The compulsory bill then passed both
houses unanimously45
During the summer of 1913 the insurance companies unsuccessfully
tried to use the newly created initiative and referendum process to repeal
the compulsory workers' compensation law. After the strategy failed, the
insurance companies then focused their efforts on the 1914 governor's
race, supporting Republican Frank Willis. Governor Cox proudly stated
to the OSFL that he would continue his policy of preventing liability insur-
ers from writing workers' compensation insurance. Willis, on the other
hand, sought support from the OSFL by stating his desire to raise bene-
fit levels.46
Willis defeated Cox in the 1914 election and conservative Republicans
reclaimed both legislative chambers, while the number of labor representa-
tives fell to its lowest in years. Seizing their chance, the insurers had House
Bill No. 1 introduced, which would have allowed private insurers to com-
pete with the state fund in the writing of workers' compensation insur-
ance. Opponents argued, however, that private insurers would "pick the
gilt edge risks, leaving all the hazardous ones to the...Fund...and
bring about its...insolvency"47 The bill was sent to the Labor Committee
which recommended that it be indefinitely postponed, to which the whole
House agreed by a vote of seventy-five to twenty-five.48
The insurers also failed in their attempt to have the workers' compensa-
tion law amended to allow injured workers to sue under the common law
without affecting their claims under the compensation law. Insurers hoped
that once the amendment passed they could obtain authority to write in-
surance against that liability. The goal was to offer workers more benefits
in hopes of obtaining their support so that the state insurance idea could
ultimately be undermined. Both the OMA and the OSFL excoriated these
proposals to their membership, and the amendment failed.49
The insurance industry then tried to obtain an administrative ruling on
their behalf, asking the Industrial Commission to modify its rules to allowThe Fractious Disputes over State Insurance 163
the industry to sell workers' compensation insurance. The request was de-
nied and the insurers finally turned to newly appointed Republican insur-
ance commissioner Frank Taggert for a license to sell mutual insurance
to employers who chose to self-insure their workers' compensation risks.
Taggert granted the license and also gave the private insurers an advantage
over the state fund by allowing them to sell insurance against common law
suits in which workers claimed that their employers' willful act or failure to
honor safety laws had caused their accidents.5°
The OSFL battled back by aiding Attorney General Edward Turner in
filing suit in the Ohio Supreme Court against over twenty insurers. While
the court deliberated, the state fund again became an issue in the guberna-
torial race of 1916. In a rematch of the 1914 race, James Cox announced
his support for a labor union petition to expel private insurance from work-
ers' compensation altogether. The court then handed down its final decision
on 31 January 1917, holding that employers had the right to self-insure and
that insurance companies could reinsure self-insuring employers.5'
Although the OSFL was dissatisfied with the court decision, the 1916
election results largely made the debate over private insurance in Ohio
moot. Cox returned as governor, the Democrats recaptured both houses,
sixteen OSFL members held seats in the legislature, and gone were "quite
a few senators and representatives who had tried to impair the Workers'
Compensation law in the interests of the liability insurance companies."
The OSFL introduced House Bill No. 1, which would have outlawed the
private insurance of workers' compensation risks. The bill sailed through
the House by a vote of 118 to 2, the Senate 28 to 2, and was quickly signed
into law by Governor Cox on 19 February 1917. The insurance companies
issued yet another court challenge on the grounds that the new law can-
celed contracts, but the Ohio Supreme Court sustained the new law.52
The Ohio case demonstrates how the relative success of the competing
economic interests depended on the structural political changes that were
occurring at the state level in the 1910s. Unions, employers, and insurance
companies framed the debate over state insurance by establishing the
menu of choices available to legislators. Throughout the short period dur-
ing which state insurance was debated in Ohio, the relative strength of the
various interest groups changed very little, but substantial changes in pub-
lic policy occurred. The key factor that produced these changes was the
undulating political power of the progressive coalition that favored state
insurance. Progressive Democrats established the state fund and continued
to strengthen it, but when conservative Republicans recaptured the major-
ity, the door was opened for private insurance. Finally, when progressive
Democrats returned to power in 1917, they slammed the door shut on
private insurance.164Chapter 6
6.5Minnesota's Failed Attempt at State Insurance
Minnesota failed to enact compulsory state insurance by one Senate
vote in 1919. The Minnesota State Federation of Labor (MnSFL) lob-
bied strongly for state insurance in 1913, when workers' compensation was
first adopted, and throughout the 191 Os. They had little success until 1918
when reformers from the Non-Partisan League seriously threatened the
dominant Republican party. Although the Non-Partisans did not capture
a majority in either chamber, they wielded enough political strength to
pass a weak state insurance bill in the House, and they barely failed in
the Senate.
The Minnesota Employers' Association (MEA) and the MnSFL agreed
to a compromise workers' compensation bill without state insurance in
1913, but the MnSFL stood firm in its belief that "no satisfactory solution
to the question of workingmen's compensation can be had except through
the medium of state insurance."53 A bill to amend the state constitution to
allow for state insurance died in the 1913 legislature, as insurance compa-
nies and employers lobbied against it. But George Gillette, president of
the MEA, issued an ultimatum to the insurance industry: if workers or
employers complained about bad treatment or high premiums, then "not
only...will Minnesota have state insurance, but it ought to have it."
Gillette's rhetoric, combined with organized labor's insistence on state in-
surance and Ohio's and Washington's recent enactment of monopoly in-
surance funds, posed a serious threat to insurance companies and inde-
pendent agents operating in Minnesota. Accordingly, in September 1914,
a "few stalwart insurance men" met in Minneapolis to form the Insurance
Federation of Minnesota (IFM) to act as the industry's lobbying group
against state workers' compensation insurance and other state intrusions
into the insurance industry.55
State insurance supporters won a significant victory in the 1917 legis-
lature when the Senate's Employers' Liability Committee recommended
passage of a state insurance bill. However, the committee suggested that
the bill be referred back to the Judiciary Committee for a report on its
constitutionality. After the Senate successfully voted to recall the bill from
Judiciary, the committee reported that the law would have been constitu-
tional, but the bill nonetheless lost forty-two to twenty-one.56 The House
did not consider the bill after the Senate defeat.
As the IFM presciently advised its members at the close of the 1917
legislative session, "the fight against state insurance in Minnesota has
really just begun." Secretary E. A. Sherman admitted that he did not
know "[w]hat new influences they [MSFL] will bring to bear in later con-
tests.. . but I mention for your earnest considerationthe Non-Partisan
League?'57 Perhaps the most important influence that organized labor
brought to the 1919 legislative session was their numbers. Between 1918The Fractious Disputes over State Insurance 165
and 1920 union ranks soared 75 percent, from fifty-one thousand mem-
bers to over eighty-nine thousand.58 But certainly the most threatening
political force in the state, from the IFM's perspective, was the emergence
of the Non-Partisan League.
The first plank of the League's labor platform was the implementation
of a state monopoly on the writing of workers' compensation insurance.
Although the Non-Partisan League failed to win the governor's seat in
1918, it was quite successful in building a coalition that altered the balance
of political power in Minnesota, pitting a newly formed coalition of grain
farmers, organized union members, and radical progressives against the
Republican party. Although the Non-Partisans were able to secure twenty-
four seats in the House and eight in the Senate, hardly a majority in either
chamber, the animosity generated in the 1918 elections was carried into
the 1919 legislative session. As Carl Chrislock noted, the Republicans'
"compulsion 'to beat' the Nonpartisan League dominated the legislature
of that year [l9l9]."State-run workers' compensation insurance proved
to be one of the battlegrounds.
Organized labor described its struggle for state insurance in 1919 as
"one of the hottest fights ever waged in the state legislature."6° The IFM
called their fight to suppress the legislation "the most closely fought legis-
lative contest Minnesota has ever known."6' After four hours of floor de-
bate in the House, during which time an amendment was passed to allow
nonprofit mutual companies or interinsurance exchanges to compete with
the state fund, a bill creating a state insurance fund won by a comfortable
seventy-eight to forty-eight margin.62 An econometric analysis of the roll-
call vote on this issue suggests that a coalition combining the efforts of
organized labor and the Non-Partisan League were key supporters of state
insurance (see Fishback and Kantor 1996, 828-33). Representative Asher
Howard, who opposed state insurance in the 1917 legislature but sup-
ported it in 1919, captured the feeling that many legislators no doubt
shared: "If you want to prevent the seats of this House from being filled
by Socialists and Nonpartisans you have got to play fair with the work-
ingmen and the farmers."63
The House's state insurance bill moved to the Senate, where the "legisla-
tive contest was very intense and the feeling engendered was extremely
bitter."64 The Senate Committee on Workmen's Compensation, by major-
ity report, substituted the House's bill for the Senate's and recommended
passage. Three senators, however, offered a minority report that would
have allowed private insurance subject to regulation by a workers' com-
pensation board.65 The Senate rejected the minority report by a vote of
thirty-one to thirty-five. The majority reportto substitute the House's
state insurance bill for a Senate state insurance billfailed passage when
the vote deadlocked at thirty-three.
The House bill came up for direct consideration the next day. Senator166Chapter 6
Charles R. Fowler, a lawyer sympathetic to the insurance interests, intro-
duced an amendment allowing employers to insure their workers' compen-
sation risks with licensed, for-profit insurers.66 The Fowler amendment
passed thirty-four to thirty-two. The amended bill was unsatisfactory to
organized labor because the primary reason for allowing the state to domi-
nate the writing of workers' compensation insurance was the belief that
the state insurance could be offered at lower cost than private insurance.
At the urging of the MnSFL, the amended bill was defeated by a vote of
nine to fifty-seven.67
Empirical analysis of the major votes on state insurance in the Senate
revealed no statistically significant patterns, which might be attributable
to the substantial logrolling within the 1919 Senate. The IFM suggested
that state insurance "was made a political issue, and the interests of the
insurance men were used as trading stock for political expediency, or to
secure votes in favor of or against other measures pending in the legisla-
ture."68 Labor claimed that a "two percent beer bill was used as a club"
against them in the Senate.69 Further, Asher (1973, 29-30) suggests that
there was a logroll between Republicans who wanted an iron ore tax killed
and legislators who wanted state insurance.
The debate over state insurance in Minnesota continued as interim com-
mittees from both chambers investigated workers' compensation and state
insurance in 1920. The stated objective of the committees was to make the
workers' compensation system more responsive to injured workers and
to lower employers' insurance costs. After an exhaustive investigation in
which the committees heard from the MnSFL, MEA, IFM, and workers'
compensation officials in ten other states, the majority of each committee
concluded that their objectives could best be achieved by encouraging
competition in the field of workers' compensation insurance and by regu-
lating insurance rates. A minority in each committee continued to propose
state insurance as the solution, but the weakening strength of the Non-
Partisan League led to the demise of monopoly state insurance in Minne-
sota.70 The 1921 legislature overwhelmingly followed the committees' ma-
jority opinion to raise benefits, allow competition among mutual and
stock companies, and establish an industrial commission to administer the
system and regulate insurers.7' Thus, while the 1921 legislators were willing
to augment the state's regulation of private industry, they stopped short
of substituting public for private enterprise. Had the Non-Partisan League
been as strong as the progressives in Ohio and Washington in earlier years,
Minnesota would have enacted state insurance in 1919.
6.6Summary
Union leaders pushed strongly for state insurance of workers' compen-
sation risk while insurance companies just as strongly opposed it, andThe Fractious Disputes over State Insurance 167
agricultural interests (and other taxpayers) worried about the possibility
of paying higher taxes if the state fund was actuarially unsound. In the
majority of states the countervailing political influences of these groups
were enough to keep most states from establishing monopoly state funds.
In ten states, however, a compromise position was reached in which private
insurers competed with a state insurance fund. The extreme position of
establishing a monopoly state fund occurred in only seven states. In some
states an unusual combination of strong organized labor and weak agricul-
tural and insurance interests led to the adoption of monopoly state insur-
ance. In others, however, organized labor only succeeded because a pro-
gressive political reform group with a broader social and political agenda
came to power and aided in adopting a state fund. Moreover, the political
reformers in some states not only garnered support from organized labor
but also co-opted agricultural interests, who at times chose to support
state insurance as part of the broader political agenda proposed by the re-
formers.
The adoption of state insurance of workers' compensation risk con-
trasted sharply with the enactment of workers' compensation legislation
generally. Because employers, workers, and insurers saw that they could
gain from the adoption of the legislation, workers' compensation was en-
acted relatively quickly in the 1910s. Because of this broad support from
the major economic interests groups with a stake in workers' compensa-
tion, the progressive movement in the early twentieth century actually
played a smaller, more indirect role in the law's overall adoption than it did
in the enactment of state insurance. State insurance was so controversial,
polarizing the same groups that came together to support workers' com-
pensation generally, that progressive politics often played a pivotal role in
the state insurance decision by forging a coalition with organized labor
and neutralizing farmers' traditional opposition.
Our quantitative and case-study analyses suggest that in order to
properly explain the growth of government, both narrow economic inter-
ests and broad-based political coalitions must be considered carefully.
Whereas some scholars of political economy have argued that one or the
other explanation is sufficient to explain why public policy is enacted, we
find that both are important and that both forces sometimes interact in
complex ways. Examining the adoption of monopoly state insurance
across the United States clearly shows that narrow economic interests and
broad political coalitions played significant, but sometimes unequal, roles.
The importance we attribute to either explanation will always depend on
the specific case under consideration.168Chapter 6
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